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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY, •: 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
Case NO. 
~
VS
 m 14924 
HERBERT L. SMART, Director 
of Finance of the State of 
Utah, and DAVID SMITH MONSON, : 
Auditor of the State of Utah, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Third 
District Court granting a declaratory judgment and mandamus 
to the plaintiff (Respondent). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Respondent filed a complaint against the appellants 
alleging the constitutionality of the Utah Housing Finance 
Agency Act and seeking a writ of mandamus that appellants 
approve the appropriation of funds and issue a warrant for the 
dispersal of such funds pursuant to said Act. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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The court declared the Act to be constitutional 
and ordered the appellants to approve and issue funds 
pursuant to the act. 
- RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek a reversal of the judgment 
of the Third Judicial District Court. 
• '••''• STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In 1975 the Utah Legislature passed the Utah 
Housing Finance Agency Act (hereafter, "Act"), L. 1975, 
ch. 190, codified as Utah Code Ann. § 63~44a~l, et. seq. 
(Supp. 1975) (hereafter all statutory references are to Utah 
Code Annotated (Supp. 1975). The Act creates the Utah 
Housing Finance Agency, a body corporate and politic of the 
State, Respondent herein, (hereafter "Agency'1). It has 
the power to sue and be sued. §§ 63-44a-3, 63-44a~9. 
Generally, the Act creates an Agency composed of state 
officials and public members appointed by the Governor, upon 
whom are conferred powers to deal with the problems of an 
inadequate supply of decent, safe, sanitary housing for 
persons of low and moderate income in Utah by increasing 
the availability of mortgage funds for such housing. 
§ 63-44a~2. 
-2-
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The Act permits the Agency to obtain funds by 
the sale of notes and bonds and other obligations* 
§§ 63*~44a~~9, 63-44a~ll. Such notes and bonds, income 
therefrom, and payments thereon, together with all 
agency property, are exempt from taxation, § 63-44a-16. 
The Agency is then commanded to make such tax exempt funds 
available on a low interest basis for the financing of the 
purchase, construction, or rehabilitation of housing for 
low and moderate income persons, §§ 63-44a~9, 63-44a-10. 
The Agency may adopt a number of techniques 
for making its funds available. It may make direct loans 
through qualified mortgage lenders to individuals for 
purchase, construction, or rehabilitation of housing. 
§ 63-44a-10 (1),(2). It may create a housing rehabilitation 
fund for direct loans for rehabilitation of low and moderate 
income housing, § 63~44a~!0 (4). It may make loans to 
local housing authorities for purchase or construction of 
low and moderate income housing. § 63-44a-10 (5). It may 
purchase loans from qualified mortgage lenders, providing 
that the funds paid the lender by the Agency will be used 
by the lender to make low interest mortgages to low and 
moderate income persons as defined by the Agency, § 63~44a-6, 
Presently, the Agency is in the process of 
finalizing rules and regulations for the implementation of 
-3-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
its initial program* It desires to make an initial sale 
of bonds in order to obtain funds to be used to purchr;-.:--e 
mortgages, and has undertaken preparations for such a 
sale* See the Affidavit of William G. Bruhn (R.183). 
At the time of passage of the Act, the 
legislature appropriated to the Agency the sum of $200,000 
to be used to establish a general operating fund and $300,000 
to establish a capital reserve fund. See Laws of Utah 
1975, Ch. 190, §20. The Agency has requested that this 
sum be disbursed to. it from the State Treasury, to be 
used to cover initial expenses and to implement its 
initial program. See the Agency's Resolution and Voucher 
attached to the Complaint* Defendants Herbert L. Smart, 
State Director of Finance and David Smith Monson, State 
Auditor, refused to take any steps to process the request 
of the Agency for funds because of substantial questions 
of the constitutionality of the Act. 
The Agency filed an action for declaratory 
judgment and mandamus to have the Act declared con-
stitutional and to require the appellants to take necessary 
steps for the dispersal of state funds. The Third Judicial 
District Court, Judge Bryant H. Croft, presiding, granted 
the Agency's requested relief and appellants brought their 
appeal. 
-4-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I [ 
THE UTAH HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY ACT IS 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT LENDS STATE CREDIT IN AID 
OF PRIVATE INDIVIDUAL PURPOSES. 
Article VI, section 29 of the Utah Con-
stitution prohibits lending state credit for private 
purposes: 
"The Legislature shall not 
authorize the State, or any 
county/ city, town, township, 
district or other political sub-
division of the State to lend 
its credit or subscribe to stock 
or bonds in aid of any railroad, 
telegraph or other private in-
dividual or corporate enterprise 
or undertaking." 
Most states have either a similar provision 
in their constitution or other provisions designed to 
restrict the expenditure of public funds where they aid 
private interests. These provisions have been .interpreted 
many times, but frequently it is difficult to apply one 
court decision to another situation because the decisions 
involve slightly different constitutional provisions, 
a balancing of public and private benefit unique to each 
case, and different interpretations of the phrase "lending 
of credit." "Lending of credit" may involve the mere 
-5-
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expenditures of funds or it may imply going into debt. 
Such lendi i of credit does not aid private interests 
if the animating purpose of the transaction is for the 
dominant benefit of the state even though private 
interests may incidentally benefit from it. The 
definition of lending credit and aiding private interests 
must both be considered. 
•"A. The Act Unconstitutionally Requires The 
State To "Lend Its Credit" Because Funds Are Appropriated 
And Debts Are Incurred. 
The courts appear to differ somewhat in their 
interpretation of the phrase "lending of credit." One 
line of cases holds that there is no loaning of credit 
unless a financial liability is imposed on the state. 
This interpretation is typified by the Idaho Supreme 
Courtfs statement in Nelson v. Marshall, 94 Idaho 7 26, 
497 P.2d 47 (1972): 
"[The loaning of credit clause 
of article 8, section 2] prohibits 
only loaning of the State's credit, 
Idaho Const, art. 8, § 2 , does not 
prohibit the loaning of State funds. 
The word 'credit1 as used in this pro-
vision implied the imposition of some 
new financial liability upon the State 
which in effect results in the creation 
of State debt for the benefit of 
private enterprises. This was the 
evil intended to be remedied by 
Idaho Const, art. 8, § 2, and similar 
-6 
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•" . provisions in other state con-
stitutions. Yet that particular 
evil is not presented by the in-
vestment of existing funds of the 
State, for no new State debts are 
created by such action." 
Another line of cases holds that the appropriation 
of state funds constitutes a "lending of credit.11 The 
case of Button v. Day, 208 Va. 494, 158 S.E. 2d 735 (1968), 
involving an Industrial Building Authority Act, typifies 
this point of view: 
"It cannot be gainsaid that 
stimulation of the development of 
industry is a public purpose warranting 
governmental participation to achieve 
the desired object of creating 
additional employment for the citizens 
of the State. It does not follow, 
however, that because the goal is 
meritorious, every method which might, 
in some way, aid its accomplishment is 
therefore constitutionally permissible; 
or, to put it another way, that because 
the purpose is public, anything done in 
furtherance thereof becomes, a fortiori, 
a proper governmental function. 
The Act before us is stamped indelibly 
with the purpose of granting credit in aid 
of private interests upon the faith of 
State funds—the precise thing the Con-
stitution says shall not be a proper 
function of government. Granting credit 
with State funds is the sole, quickening 
function of the Authority, the very core 
of its existence. To withhold the use of 
State funds or to withdraw the power to 
grant credit would unavoidably bring about 
the early demise of the whole scheme. 
We have noted with interest and given 
attention to the Attorney General's argu-
ment that there is no extension of credit 
involved in a 'one shot1 appropriation of 
cash unattended by an obligation to 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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appropriate further funds. In a 
proper case, that might be a valid 
argument. We know here, however, that 
any money that is appropriated by the 
legislature to the guaranty fund, whether . 
initially or in subsequent appropriation 
acts, is to be used, by the express terms 
of the Act, for nothing but the granting 
of credit, and that simply is un-
constitutionally impermissible. 
We have not overlooked our rule that, 
in determining whether there has been a 
violation of the credit clause, we look 
to the animating purpose of a public 
transaction to see if it is for the dominant 
benefit of the State* But unlike any other 
case which we have had before us, there is 
inherent in the operation of the Authority 
and to the use of the guaranty fund the 
fact, expressed in the Act, that the debts 
to be guaranteed by the Authority and to 
be discharged with State money from the 
guaranty fund upon default, are otherwise 
unobtainable loans secured from private 
sources by private firms to finance con-
struction or improvement of privately 
owned industrial plants. In such a 
situation, it is difficult, if not well-
nigh impossible, to say that the benefit 
to private interests is merely incidental 
or, conversely, that the benefit to the 
State is paramount." 
This Court has adopted the viewpoint expressed 
in Button v. Day, i.e., the appropriation of State funds, 
as well as the incurring of a liability, constitute a lending 
of credit within the purview of Article VI, Section 29, 
of the Constitution. In Utah State Land Board v. Utah State 
Finance Commission, 12 U.2d 265, 365 P.2d 213 (1961), the 
court discussed the arguments made in the Constitutional 
-8-
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Convention concerning the provision and then stated: 
"It appears from the argument 
and provisions adopted that the ad-
visability of investing in stocks 
and bonds was considered, and that 
the Convention only had as its ob-
ject the prevention of the use of 
State funds or credit "in aid ol any 
railroad, telegraph or other private 
individual or corporate enterprise or 
undertaking. 
The provision fin aid of any 
railroad1 etc. was expressly in-
tended to prevent the use of the finances 
of the State to give support to private 
interests or enterprises. . . . " 
With respect to the Act, it provides that the 
Agency may issue revenue bonds but that the faith and credit 
of the State or any of its political subdivisions may not 
be pledged to their payment. § 63-44a~15. The Act pro-
vides that in the event the capital reserve fund falls be-
low its required level, the Agency may certify to the 
Governor the amount needed to. restore the capital reserve 
and that the Legislature may appropriate the needed funds 
which shall be repaid to the General Fund from moneys in 
excess of the amount required to keep the Agency self-
supporting. § 63~44a~12 (1) (f). It also provides that the 
Agency, among other things, may receive gifts or grants 
from any department or agency of the State. § 63-44a-9(j). 
It provides for an appropriation of $300,000 to establish 
the capital reserve fund, which amount shall be repaid to 
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the General Fund within ten years from revenues generated • 
by the Agency; and it provides for an appropriation 
of $200,000 to establish the mortgage guarantee fundf 
which amount shall be paid to the General Fund within tet.\ 
years from revenues generated by the Agency. 
There are a number of recent cases in which 
constitutionality of housing finance acts somewhat similar 
to the Act have been upheld. In some of these cases, the 
act provided that the agency would certify to the governor 
the amount of money needed to keep the reserve funds intact 
and provided that the legislature could appropriate the 
needed funds. However, in the holdings that the "lending 
of credit" clause was not violated, it should be noted 
that the courts were among those that have interpreted 
the "lending of credit" to mean the creation of a liability 
on the part of the state rather than including the 
appropriation of public funds. In these cases, the courts 
stated that the provision that the legislature may 
appropriate funds did not create a liability. See Johnson 
v. Pennsylvania Housing Finance Agency, 4 53 Pa. 329, 3 09 
A.2d 528 (1973), and the cases cited therein. 
Thus it appears that Utah does not accept a 
narrow view of the prohibition against the lending of 
credit. A single appropriation for private uses, and is 
present here, violates the Constitution. 
-10-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
But in fact there is not only a single 
appropriation because the Act imposes long range liabilities, 
albeit contingent, on future legislatures. It is suggested 
that the necessity for future fueling by the legislature 
is permissive only and does not amount to an obligation 
or liability. In many respects, however, this argument 
is merely a matter of semantics by which the true intent 
of the Constitution would be avoided. As a matter of fiscal 
necessity and practical reality, any future default in 
obligations by the agency would be brought to the attention 
of the Governor who would "invite" the legislature to 
remedy the situation to preserve the credit and good name 
of the State of Utah. 
The single appropriation of funds for private 
purposes constitutes "lending credit" under Utah law, but 
even under the most restrictive, definition of "lending 
credit" the implied obligation for future funding inherent 
in the Act creates future debt or liabilities on the State 
on which purchasers of bonds will rely, basing such decisions 
in part on the credit worthiness of the State of Utah. 
Therefore, the Act violates the Utah constitutional 
provisionss, Article VI,. section 29. 
B. The Act Unconstitutionally Requires The 
State To Aid Private Individual Enterprises Or Undertakings 
Because It Primarily Benefits Private Rather Than Public 
Interests. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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It is not possible to state an exact 
definition of "public purpose" as it is subject to 
change, with changing circumstances, Walker v. Alaska 
State Mortgage Association, 416 P.2d 245 (Alaska 1966). 
Furthermore, the fact that private, interests are 
incidentally benefited through the implementation of 
a program involving primarily a public purpose does not 
negate the public nature of the activity, Thomas v» 
Daughters of the Utah Pioneers, 114 Utah 108, 197 P.2d 
477 (1948). 
Utah cases permitting public funds to be used 
for development or construction where private benefit is 
only incidental are clearly distinguishable in that all 
the facilities involved were, indeed, public facilities, 
to be used directly by the general public. Tribe v. Salt 
Lake City Corporation, 540 P.2d 499 (Utah, 1975) (public 
parking facility); Backman v. Salt Lake County, 13 Utah 2d 
412, 375 P.2d 756 (1962) (Civic auditorium and arena); 
Conder v. University of Utah, 123 Utah 182, 257 P.2d 
367 (1953) (university dormitories); Spence v» Utah State 
Agricultural College, 119 Utah 104, 225 P.2d 18 (1950) 
(college construction); Thomas v. Daughters of the Pioneers, 
114 Utah 108, 197 P.2d 477 (1948) (public historical museum). 
Somewhat farther afield is Allen v. Tooele County, 21 Utah 
2d 383, 445 P.2d 994 (1968) involving the creation of an 
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industrial plant, but even this is distinguishable. It was 
to be paid for out of lease payments and benefit the local 
economy generally. 
In Tribe v.. Salt Lake City Corporation, supra, 
the Court made special note of the fact that: 
"The funds are being used by a 
public body for a public purpose, i.e., 
to terminate urban blight; they are 
not being given or loaned to a private 
person,~nor are they used primarily for 
private purposes." (Emphasis added.) 
Contrast the public purpose indicated in these 
cases with the purpose for the funds to be expended ui-,.3er 
the Act in question for private housing. Indeed, what could 
possibly be more personal and private than a private home. 
By no stretch of meaning can it be said that the Act is 
primarily public in purpose with only incidental benefit 
accruing to private interests. The Act directly benefits 
private interests both individuals and financial institutions, 
by making available low interest, tax exempt funds for the 
purchase, construction or rehabilitation of housing. The 
public benefit is incidental. 
Consistent with this reasoning is the Michigan 
case of In re Advisary Opinion, 380 Mich. 554, 158 N.W.2d 
416 (1968), in which the Michigan Supreme Court considered 
an act to create a state housing development authority. 
The act was comparable to the Utah act now in question in 
providing for the low interest loaning of money for low 
cost housina. Under f-.h^  MiVVn'rra« r^ ~~4--: 4.,.4-1— - . _ . 
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could not be used for anything but public purposes without 
a two-thirds vote of the legislative. The court con-
cluded that: 
"There can be no doubt that it is 
a proper public purpose for the state 
to concern itself with the housing 
of its inhabitants-11 Id. 158 N.W.2d-
at 425. 
A clear distinction was drawn between regulatory measures 
such as building codes in na valid exercise of the police 
power to insure that our people will live in safe and 
sanitary dwellings" Id., 158 N.W. 2d at 424, or assisting 
private enterprise by research, study and the disemination 
of information, and the direct expenditure of public funds 
to "rewire or fireproof every building in the state/' 
Id* The court held: 
"The final light in which the 
notion of public purpose must be 
viewed has to do with the appropriation 
of public funds to the state housing 
development authority. As has been 
already seen, Act 346 is itself an 
appropriation bill, by reason of the 
provisions of section 57 providing 
$5,000 for the initial administration 
of the law. Since the creation of 
the state housing development authority 
as an agency of state government 
is a constitutional means to serve a 
proper public purpose. . . an appro-
priation to be used purely for the 
administration of the authority is an 
appropriation for a public purpose. 
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But the act contemplates appro-
priations to the housing development 
fund, and to the capital reserve 
sinking fund as well. The housing 
development fund will be used to 
make loans and advances to private 
corporations. The capital reserve 
sinking fund will be used to repay 
bonds issued for the same purpose. 
Appropriations to these funds do not 
constitute appropriations for public 
purposes." I<3. , 158 N.W- 2d at 
429-430. 
It is a noble purpose to improve housing, 
but though it is prompted by humanitarian desires, it 
is nonetheless primarily private in nature and to lend 
state credit for such a purpose violates the Utah Con-
stitution. 
POINT II 
THE UTAH HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY ACT IS 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT CREATES STATE DEBT. 
Article XIV Section 1 of the Utah Constitution 
limits the amount of permissable State debt and specifies 
the purposes for which the State may go into debt: 
"To meet casual deficits or failures 
in revenue, and for necessary expen-
ditures for public purposes including 
the erection of public buildings, and 
for the payment of alf Territorial 
indebtedness assumed by the State, the 
State may contract debts, not ex-
ceeding in the aggragate at any one 
time, an amount equal to one and one-
half per centum of the value of the 
taxable property of the State, as shown 
by the last assessment for State purposes, 
previous to the incurring of such in-
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debtedness. But the State shall never 
contract any indebtedness, except as 
in the next Section provided E1. . . 
to repel invasion, suppress insurrection, 
or to defend the State in war. . .. . r 
Art. XIV, Section 2], in excess of such 
amount, and all moneys arising from 
loans herein authorize!, shall be 
applied solely to the purposes for which 
they were obtained." (Emphasis added). 
The same reasoning regarding the creation of 
State debt by the Act, supra, point I.A., applies equally 
to the application of this constitutional provision. 
The contingent liabilities placed on the State Treasury 
out of fiscal necessity and practical reality constitute 
debt in violation of this constitutional provision. 
-16-
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POINT III 
THE UTAH HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY ACT IS • 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE T-iE NATURE, PURPOSE AND 
BENEFIT OF THE AGENCY ARE PRIMARILY PRIVATE WHILE 
IT PURPORTS TO ENJOY THE BENEFITS OF A PUBLIC ENTITY. 
Several provisions of the Utah Constitution 
make it abundantly clear that public and private 
property must remain inviolately separate. For 
example, private property may not be taken "without 
due process of law," Article I, section 7, and if it 
is to be taken or used for "public use," "just 
compensation" must be given, Article I, section 22. 
In spite of this obvious separation in the law the 
act totally confuses the distinction. 
A. The Act is Unconstitutional Because it 
Creates a Private Corporation by Special Legislation. 
Article XII, section 1 provides: 
"Corporations may be 
formed under general laws, but 
shall not be created by special 
a c t s . . . . 
Because the primary purposes and benefits of the Utah 
Housing Finance Agency are private, it cannot be a 
public entity and must therefore be a private 
corporation (see discussion on the private nature of 
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I 
i 
the Agency's purposes, supra, point I.B.). The Agency 
exists for*an indefinite period of time, may own 
property, and may sue and be sued, as any other corporate 
entity. Yet contrary to the above constitutional 
provision it has been created by a special act. 
B. The Act is Unconstitutional Because it 
Exempts Private Property From Taxation* 
Article XIII of Utah's Constitution requires 
all non-ex --apt property to be taxed, and provides, in 
part: 
"Section 2. All tangible 
property in the state, not exempt 
under the laws of the United 
States, or under this Constitution, 
Shall be taxed in proportion to its 
value. . . 
Section 3. The Legislature 
shall provide by law a uniform and 
equal rate of assessment and taxa-
tion on all tangible property in the 
state . . . so that every person and 
corporation shall pay a tax in 
proportion to the value of his, her, 
or its tangible property. . . 
Section 10. All corporations 
or persons in this Stater or doing 
business herein, shall be subject to 
taxation for State, County, School, 
Municipal or other purposes, on the 
real and personal property owned 
or used by them within the Territorial 
limits of the authority levying the 
tax." 
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The Act provides that the Agency property i 
exempt from taxation. Section 63-44a~16. Because the 
pruposes and benefits of the Agency are primarily 
private, see I.B., supra, and the Agency is essentially 
a private corporation, see III.A., supra, it is 
unconstitutional to grant such tax exemption. 
POINT IV 
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE UTAH HOUSING 
FINANCE AGENCY ACT SERVES A LEGITIMATE PUBLIC PURPOSE 
RATHER THAN PRIVATE INTERESTS, IT IS NEVERTHELESS 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE SUCH PURPOSES WOULD BE LOCAL IN 
NATURE AND THE ACT DOES NOT COMPLY WITH THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROVISIONS REGARDING MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. . 
The Utah Constitution clearly requires that 
the Legislature allow local problems to be handled 
locally to the extent possible and such legislation 
must have general and uniform application. Article XI, 
section 5, emphasizes that municipal problems are to be 
handled by municipal corporations created by general laws 
and suggests the extensive scope of municipal power and 
authority including taxing, borrowing, issuing bonds, 
providing sanitary, police and similar regulations and 
to furnish generally all local public services, facilities, 
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and improvements. It reads, in part: 
"Corporations for municipal 
purposes shall not be created by 
special laws. The legislature by 
general laws shall provide for the 
incorporation, organization and 
classification of cities and towns 
• • • 
Each city forming its charter 
under this section shall have, and 
is hereby granted, the authority to 
exercise all powers relating to 
municipal affairs, and to adopt and 
enforce v/ithin its limits, local police, 
sanitary and similar regulations not 
in conflict with the general law. . . 
The power to be conferred upon 
the cities by this section shall include 
the following: 
(a) To levy, assess and collect 
taxes and borrow money, within the limits 
prescribed by general law, and to levy 
and collect special assessments for 
benefits conferred. 
(b) To furnish all local public 
services . . . to acquire by•condemna-
tion, or otherwise, within or without 
the corporate limits, property necessary 
for any such purposes, subject to restric-
tions imposed by general law for the 
protection of other communities . . . 
(c) To make local public improve-
ments and to acquire by condemnation, 
or otherwise, property within its 
corporate limits necessary for such 
improvements; and also to acquire an 
excess over than [that] needed for any 
such improvement and to sell or lease 
such excess property with restrictions, 
in order to protect and preserve the 
improvement. 
(d) To issue and sell bonds on the 
security of any such excess property. . . 
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See also Article I, section 24, and Article VI, 
section 26• . 
Article VI, section 28, explicitly states: 
"The Legislature shall not 
delegate to any special commission, 
private corporation or association, 
any power to make, supervise or 
interfere with any municipal 
improvements, money, property, or 
effects, whether held in trust or 
otherwise, to levy taxes, to select 
a capitol site, or to perform any 
municipal functions." 
Article XIII, section 5 provides: 
"The Legislature shall not impose 
taxes for the purpose of any county, 
city, town or other municipal corpora-
tion, but may, by law, vest in the 
corporate authorities thereof, 
respectively, the power to assess and 
collect taxes for all purposes of such 
corporation." 
It is clear that to whatever extent there are 
local problems of an inadequate supply of decent, 
safe, sanitary housing for persons of low or moderate 
income, and to whatever extent it is constitutional for 
a governmental entity to make funds available directly 
to private individuals to remedy such problem, that 
function not only may be left to municipalities, but 
pursuant to the Constitution, it must be left to 
municipalities. In creating a special agency to deal 
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with such problems in a statewide basis by the partial 
use of state tax dollars, the Act circumvents the clear 
intent of the Constitution. 
POINT V 
THE UTAH HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY ACT IS UNCON-
STITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT CONSTITUTES AN IMPROPER DELEGATION 
OF LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY. 
The Utah Constitution provides for the separa-
tion of the legislative, executive and judicial functions 
of government, Article V, section 1, and vests the 
legislative power in the senate, house, and people, 
Article VI, section 1. It is well recognized that the 
legislature may not delegate this law-making power to 
administrative agencies, State v. Goss, 79 Utah 599, 
11 P.2d 340 (1932). The legislature must set clearly 
defined guidelines for the scope, purpose and application 
of the legislation to enable an administrative agency to 
function its authority. See, for example, Clayton v. 
Bennett, 5 Utah 2d 152, 298 P.2d 531 (1956). 
The Act is not "complete in itself,11 leaving 
many loose ends for the agency to try to tie without the 
benefit of a clearly defined policy or guideline. For 
example, the Act speaks in terms of "low and moderate 
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income persons" without any defining of those terms 
either specifically or by reference to a statistical 
"average" income, or any other clearly defined guideline 
to indicate who would be eligible for such funds. 
Section 63~44a~3(6). Furthermore, the criteria for 
such "low and moderate income person" may vary depending 
on the locality within which he dwells (see discussion 
on the local nature of•the problem under point IV, supra). 
The Act purports to confer upon the agency power 
to deal with the problem of the inadequate supply of "safe" 
and "sanitary" housing without any guidance as to the 
scope and nature of that authority. It appears the agency 
would have unbridled power to define these terms, with 
large sums of money in the balance, without regard to 
local building codes, health regulations, or other local 
restrictions (see discussion on the local nature of the 
problem under Point IV, supra). 
• In light of such serious open-ended questions, 
the Act is not complete in itself and thus a great deal 
of law-making remains in the hands of an administrative 
agency. Such power in this agency constitutes an improper 
delegation of legislative authority in violtion of the 
Constitution. 
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POINT VI 
THE UTAH HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY ACT IS 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT CREATES AN IRREVOCABLE 
FRANCHISE, PRIVILEGE OR IMMUNITY. 
Article I, section 23, prohibits that: "No 
law shall be passed granting irrevocably any franchise, 
privilege or immunity.11 The purpose of such a provision 
is to avoid the problem of one legislature binding the 
actions, and therefore limiting the power, of a subsequent 
legislature. Thomas v. Daughters of the Utah Pioneers, 
supra* 
The Act provides that the state shall not limit 
or alter the rights granted the agency to fulfill its 
contracts or impair the rights of bondholders. Section 
63-44a-14. Such provision goes beyond the requirement •;., 
that contract rights may not be constitutionally impaired. 
This provision, by its terms, purports to limit any 
future legislature in what it may do in altering agency 
power or in permitting alteration of agreements with bond-
holders, even by mutual agreement on agreeable terms. 
The fact that eventually time will eliminate all 
such bonded indebtedness does not alter the fact that 
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such benefits, for a time, are in fact irrevocable. 
The agency has perpetual existence, Section 63-44a-9, 
and the Act seems to permit various bonds to be issued 
over time. Inasmuch as the bonded indebtedness -could 
be created over an indefinite period of time, the 
irrevocability likewise would extend over a period of 
time. But even an attempt to bind a future legislature 
even one year hence would be, and is, to that extent, 
unconstitutional. 
CONCLUSION 
The Utah Housing Finance Agency Act violates 
numerous provisions of the Utah Constitution. It 
creates a state debt and lends state credit to private 
undertakings. Through special legislation it infringes 
on uniquely municipal functions. It improperly dele-
gates legislative authority to an administrative 
agency and grants an irrevocable franchise, privilege 
or immunity. Appellants submit that the decision of 
the lower court should be reversed. The act should 
be declared unconstitutionl and the defendants should 
be relieved of any requirement of complying therewith 
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or of approving the dispers 
thereof. 
[ of funds in aid 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROLKRT B. HANSEN 
Att >rney General 
WILLIAM T. EVANS 
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Assistant Attorney General 
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